UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
DIANE L.,	

Plaintiff,

v. 5:21-CV-0383 (ML)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

OLINSKY LAW GROUP Counsel for the Plaintiff 250 South Clinton Street-Suite 210 Syracuse, New York 13202

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Counsel for the Defendant J.F.K. Federal Building, Room 625 15 New Sudbury Street Boston, Massachusetts 02203

CHRISTINE A. SAAD, ESQ. Special Assistant U.S. Attorney

ALEXANDER C. HOBAICA, ESQ.

MIROSLAV LOVRIC, United States Magistrate Judge

ORDER

Currently pending before the Court in this action, in which Plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner of Social Security, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. Oral argument was heard

This matter, which is before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in General Order No. 18. Under that General Order once issue has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally, as if cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

in connection with those motions on September 22, 2022, during a telephone conference conducted on the record. At the close of argument, I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner's determination was supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by Plaintiff in this appeal.

After due deliberation, and based upon the Court's oral bench decision, which has been transcribed, is attached to this order, and is incorporated herein by reference, it is

ORDERED as follows:

- 1) Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 15) is DENIED.
- 2) Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 19) is GRANTED.
- 3) The Commissioner's decision denying Plaintiff Social Security benefits is AFFIRMED.
 - 4) Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED.
- 5) The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based upon this determination, DISMISSING Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety and closing this case.

Dated: September 23, 2022 Binghamton, New York

> Miroslav Lovric United States Magistrate Judge Northern District of New York

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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vs. 5:21-CV-0383

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

DECISION AND ORDER

September 23, 2022

The HONORABLE MIROSLAV LOVRIC,
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: ALEXANDER HOBAICA, ESQ.

For Defendant: CHRISTINE SAAD, ESQ.

Ruth I. Lynch, RPR, RMR, NYSRCR Official United States Court Reporter Binghamton, New York 13901

THE COURT: The Court begins its analysis and decision as follows:

First, plaintiff has commenced this proceeding pursuant to Title 42 United States Code Section 405(g) to challenge the adverse determination by the Commissioner of Social Security finding that she was not disabled at the relevant times and therefore ineligible for the benefits that she sought.

By way of background the Court starts as follows: Plaintiff was born in 1980. She is currently 41 years of age. She was approximately 34 years of age at the alleged onset of her disability on November 1st of 2014. At the time of her administrative hearing on August 11th of 2017, plaintiff lived with her mother, her 18-year-old son, and her 11-year-old daughter. Plaintiff stands approximately 5 feet 5 inches in height and weighs approximately 165 pounds. Plaintiff completed an associate's degree and can communicate in English.

Procedurally the Court sets forth the following in the record. Plaintiff applied for Title II benefits on May 20th of 2015, alleging an onset date of November 1, 2014. In support of her claim for disability benefits, plaintiff claims disability based on a back injury, right shoulder injury, and migraines. Administrative Law Judge Shawn Bozarth conducted a hearing on August 11th of 2017 to

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address plaintiff's application for benefits. In her request for a review to the Social Security Administration Appeals Council, plaintiff challenged the ALJ's appointment under the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution, that being U.S. Constitution Article II Section 2 Clause 2. The Appeals Council vacated the ALJ's decision and Administrative Appeals Judges Edward G. Aldrich and A. Van Soest issued a new independent unfavorable decision on August 30th of 2019. Plaintiff appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York before U.S. Magistrate Judge Andrew Baxter, where the parties agreed on July 9th of 2020 by stipulation that the decision of the Appeals Council be vacated and remanded. On August 17th of 2020 the Appeals Council remanded to an ALJ for further proceedings, consistent with that order. Thereafter, ALJ David Romeo conducted a new hearing on January 20th of 2021. ALJ Romeo issued an unfavorable decision on February 2nd of 2021. This action was commenced on April 5th of 2021, and it is therefore timely. In his decision, ALJ Romeo applied the five -excuse me, applied the familiar five-step test for determining disability claim. At step one, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the

period from her alleged onset date of November 1, 2014 through March 13 of 2018. The ALJ noted that plaintiff was awarded workers' compensation benefits during the period at issue.

At step two, the ALJ concluded that from

November 1st, 2014 through March 13th of 2018, plaintiff had
the following severe impairments: Lumbar degenerative disc
disease, with L5 to S1 radiculopathy; status post right
shoulder acromioplasty migraine headaches; obesity;
generalized anxiety disorder; major depressive disorder; and
PTSD.

At step three, ALJ Romeo concluded that from November 1, 2014 through March 13th of 2018 plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equalled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Sections 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526, and the ALJ focusing on the following listings: Listing 1.02 dealing with major dysfunction of a joint; listing 1.04 dealing with disorders of the spine; listing 11.02 dealing with epilepsy; listing 12.04 dealing with depressive, bipolar, and related disorders; listing 12.06 dealing with anxiety and obsessive compulsive disorders; and listing 12.15 dealing with trauma— and stressor—related disorders. The ALJ also considered the plaintiff's obesity under SSR 19-2p in combination with her other impairments

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and mental disorders pursuant to 20 CFR Sections 404.1520a and 416.920a.

Next, the ALJ next determined that from November 1, 2014 through March 13, 2018, plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work except that plaintiff could never climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; that plaintiff could occasionally climb ramps, stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and operate foot controls; that plaintiff could frequently reach, handle, finger, and feel with both upper extremities; also that plaintiff could have no exposure to high, exposed places or moving mechanical parts. The ALJ also concluded that plaintiff could tolerate a moderate noise intensity level; that plaintiff could also tolerate occasional exposure to light brighter than that typically found in an indoor work environment, such as an office or retail store. The ALJ concluded that plaintiff could work at a consistent pace throughout the workday but not at a production rate pace in which each task must be completed within a strict time deadline. Plaintiff -- the ALJ concluded that plaintiff could tolerate occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the public. The ALJ also concluded plaintiff could also tolerate occasional changes in the work setting. The ALJ also indicated plaintiff needed an option to stand for 5 minutes every 20 minutes of

sitting but could remain on task while standing. The ALJ also indicated plaintiff required a cane to walk but not for balance while standing. The ALJ also indicated plaintiff could tolerate a low level of work pressure which is defined as work not requiring multitasking, very detailed job tasks, significant independent judgment, very short deadlines, or teamwork in completing job tasks.

At step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff could not perform the past relevant work as a nurse assistant, nursery school attendant, or salesperson.

Next, at step five, the ALJ concluded that based on the testimony of the vocational expert and considering plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, from November 1, 2014 through March 13 of 2018, that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could have performed. More specifically, the vocational expert testified that plaintiff could have performed the requirements of representative occupations such as an addresser, a stuffer, and polisher of eyeglass frames. The ALJ therefore found that plaintiff was not disabled.

Now, as the parties know, this Court's functional role in this case is limited and extremely deferential. I must determine whether correct legal principles were applied and whether the determination is supported by substantial

evidence, defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would find sufficient to support a conclusion. The Second Circuit has noted in Brault V. Social Security Administration Commissioner, found at 683 F3d. 443, a 2012 case, and the Circuit noted therein that this standard is demanding, more so than the clearly erroneous standard. The Second Circuit noted in Brault that once there is a finding of fact, that fact can be rejected only if a reasonable fact-finder would have to conclude otherwise.

Now, on appeal before this Court, plaintiff raises one contention in their appeal. Plaintiff argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's RFC findings because he failed to properly weigh the opinion evidence of plaintiff -- of plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Jennie Brown, MD.

The Court begins its analysis by setting forth the following: As the parties set forth in their briefs, the opinion of Dr. Brain -- Brown, excuse me. The opinion of Dr. Brown, that is, is subject to the treating physician rule. For the reasons set forth in defendant's brief, I find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's evaluation of the medical opinion evidence from Dr. Brown. Dr. Brown opined, inter alia, that plaintiff would be off task more than 20 percent of the time during an 8-hour workday and would likely be absent from work more than 4 days per week.

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The ALJ afforded Dr. Brown's opinion, quote, some but not controlling weight, end of guote, holding that, quote, while most of the proposed limitations have been incorporated into the claimant's RFC, end quote, the ALJ did not incorporate Dr. Brown's assessment regarding plaintiff's ability to remain on task or maintain attendance. support of this determination the ALJ supportably cited and noted the following: One, normal mental status exams and reported activities and abilities. Two, a 2015 function report, in which plaintiff reported that, A, she did not need special help or reminders to take her medications or tend to her personal needs and grooming; B, plaintiff denied problems with paying attention, following instructions, and getting along with other people, including authority figures; C, plaintiff lived in a house with family and supervised her children's daily living activities; and, D, plaintiff performed self -- self-care tasks, prepared meals, did light cleaning and some laundry, drove, went out alone, handled money, shopped, and attended church and doctor appointments. Further, the ALJ found that all of plaintiff's mental status exams throughout the period at issue had been largely benign. Next, the ALJ properly considered plaintiff's alleged limitations based on her reported migraines. More specifically, the ALJ considered the medical records

indicating that in January 2017 plaintiff, quote, was admitted overnight for a migraine headache that had lasted three days and reportedly caused right eye pain and photophobia, end of quote. However, the ALJ supportably concluded that after receiving a Reglan injection and fluid bolus, plaintiff improved. Indeed, the ALJ considered that in February 2017 plaintiff, quote, only had three migraines over the course of the month, end of quote. Thus, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence of record.

Although plaintiff highlights evidence that may support her position, as long as the ALJ's position is supported by substantial evidence, which the Court here finds it is, it will prevail.

Finally, because the ALJ's analysis of Dr. Brown's opinion and corresponding RFC were supported by substantial evidence, plaintiff's derivative challenge to the vocational expert's testimony about jobs consistent with that RFC also fails.

For these reasons I find and conclude that plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied. Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted. Plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed. And the

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Commissioner's decision denying plaintiff benefits is
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     hereby affirmed.
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               This constitutes the decision and analysis of the
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